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Abstract 
We use a Hotelling linear city model to study competition between open 
source and proprietary software, where only the producer of the proprietary software 
aims at maximizing the profit.    The producer of the proprietary software must decide 
on compatibility.  Different compatibility strategies will lead to different network 
externality, and thus result in different profit for the producer of the proprietary 
software.  We found that the proprietary producer’s choice of compatibility strategy 
depends on the market coverage conditions.  When the market is fully covered, 
one-way compatibility is the best strategy for the proprietary software.  When the 
market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is the best strategy.    Such results are 
not affected by software quality.    Furthermore, when the provider of the open source 
software pursues the maximum market share rather than reacts passively, two-way 
compatibility would be the best choice for both the open source and the proprietary 
software.    Moreover, the proprietary software producer does not favor its proprietary 
rival changing to open source software.    Such a change may lower the social welfare. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  Recent years have seen the striking success of open source software, which 
allows software developers to use shared source codes, identify and correct errors, and 
redistribute the source codes (OSI 2001, O’Reilly 1999).  One of the most famous 
and successful open source software projects is Linux, which commands a third 
market share within the server operating system market, and whose share is expected 
to grow to 41 percent by 2005 (International Data Corporation IDC 2002).    Another 
well known example is Apache, which supports 67 percent of web sites on the 
Internet (Netcraft Web Server Survey 2004).    Other successful open source software 
products have had significant market shares in their product categories.    For instance, 
Sendmail, an open source email transfer program, carries an estimated 80% of the 
entire world’s e-mail traffic (Weber 2004). 
  Open source software threatens proprietary software producers.
2  Amazon 
reported that adopting open source software has reduced 25 percent of its technology 
expenses.  In the city of Europe, Munich is switching from Windows to Linux, and 
from Internet Explorer (IE) to Mozilla browser (CNet News 2004a).   
  To survive and win the maximum profit in the battle with the open source 
software, proprietary software producers may adopt one of four different 
compatibility strategies, i.e., incompatibility, two-way compatibility, inward 
compatibility, and outward compatibility.
3  These four compatibility strategies can 
be understood through the following examples:   
z  Windows, a proprietary software product, is incompatible with Linux, an 
open source software product.   
z  In the case of web browsers, Internet Explorer, a proprietary software 
product, is two-way compatible with Mozilla, an open source product.    Files 
created for IE users can be used by Mozilla users and vice versa. 
                                                        
2  We use the term ‘proprietary software’ as non-free software (Working Group on Libre Software 
2000) 
3 Katz and Shapiro (1998) defined compatibility as follows: “When two programs can 
communicate with one another and/or be used with the same complementary system components, 
they are said to be compatible”.   3
z  In the web server market, Microsoft IIS (a proprietary web server) is inward 
compatible with Apache (an open source web server): Microsoft IIS can 
support both PHP and ASP, server side programming languages.  Thus, 
programs designed for Apache using PHP language can be executed in IIS.  
However, since ASP belongs to Microsoft and can not execute on Apache, 
the programs designed for IIS using ASP are not usable in Apache. 
z  Finally, outward compatibility means that the files or programs designed for 
the proprietary software can be used by the open source software while files 
or programs designed for the open source software are not usable by the 
proprietary software. Realistically, outward compatibility is seldom 
observed.  
  These different compatibility strategies present a series of research questions: 
why would a proprietary software producer choose different strategies of 
compatibility when facing competition from open source software?  How would the 
choices of compatibility affect the profitability of a proprietary software producer?  
Furthermore, what are the welfare implications?   
  Another series of questions relates to the impact of open source software.    If the 
open source software pursues maximum market share rather than reacts passively, 
should the proprietary software producer change it compatibility strategy?  How 
would the proprietary producer’s profit, price and market share be affected if its rival 
switches from proprietary software to open source software?  Does such a switch 
benefit society or not?   
  This paper addresses these research questions using Hotelling’s model of 
competition between the open source and proprietary software.  In contrast with the 
conventional Hotelling model, only one party – the proprietary software producer – 
aims at maximizing profit, and the open source software is passive. 
  The different compatibility choices of the proprietary software result in different 
network externalities for the open source and proprietary software.  Thus, the price 
and profit of the proprietary software varies correspondently.  We compare the   4
maximum profit of the proprietary software under different compatibility strategies, 
and propose the best compatibility strategy for the propriety software producer.
4  
The main findings in this part are: When the market is fully covered, i.e., when all 
the consumers purchase one of the two products, inward compatibility is the best 
strategy.   However, when the market is partly covered, two-way compatibility is the 
best strategy.    Furthermore, the welfare analysis provides some implications on how 
the welfare would be affected by different parameters, such as the network externality 
intensity and software quality.   
  Next, we relax the conditions of the basic model to investigate competition 
between open source and proprietary software under different scenarios.    Firstly, we 
suppose that the open source software aims at maximizing the marker share rather 
than reacts passively.  In such a case, two-way compatibility is a Nash Equilibrium 
in both fully covered market and partly covered market. 
  Secondly, we examine the impact of open source software on proprietary 
software and on society.  It is found that a proprietary software producer does not 
favor its proprietary rival changing to open source software because such change will 
lower its market share, price and profit.  Furthermore, contrary to the general belief 
that the change from proprietary software to open source software will benefit society, 
we find that under certain conditions, such a change will decrease social welfare. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature 
on open source software.  Section 3 introduces the basic Hotelling model of 
asymmetric competition between open source and proprietary software.  In sections 
4, we compare the market results under different strategy choices when the base-level 
qualities of the open source and proprietary software are same.  Section 5 presents 
market results when open source and proprietary software have different base-level 
qualities.  Section 6 proposes the best compatibility strategy under different market 
coverage conditions.  Section 7 investigates the implication for welfare.  Section 8 
extends the basic model to investigate the competition between open source and 
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strategy for a proprietary software producer.   5
proprietary software under different scenarios.  Section 9 discusses the results and 
suggests possible directions for future work. 
 
2. Literature Review   
  The most widely investigated research question in past literature on open source 
software is to identify the economic and non-economic motivations for individual 
developers to contribute to open source software (Lerner and Tirole 2002, Lakhani 
and Wolf 2003, Hann et al. 2002).  Currently, researchers classify the possible 
reasons into intrinsic motivation, such as intellectual stimulation (Lakhani and Wolf 
2003), and extrinsic motivation, including career concerns (Lerner and Tirole 2002) 
and peer recognition (Raymond 1999, Vostroknutov 2002).   
  Another theme of prior research focuses on the quality of open source software 
and the competition between open source and proprietary software.  An important 
conclusion is that open source software is not necessarily inferior in quality to 
proprietary software (Mishra et al. 2002, Dalle and Jullien 2002, Kuan 2001, Johnson 
2001, Bessen 2002).  This conclusion is derived from models of different aspects: 
Mishra et al. (2002) compared the quality of software under open source and closed 
environments; Kuan (2001) demonstrated that open source software has a higher rate 
of quality improvement than proprietary software; Johnson (2001) modeled open 
source software as the private provision of public goods; Dalle and Jullien (2002) 
presented organizational structure and compatibility as key factors to the quality of 
open source software. 
  Within the research theme outlined above, one strand has been to consider the 
competition between open source and proprietary software.    Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ghemawat (2003) modeled the competition between Windows and Linux as a 
dynamic “mixed duopoly”, where a not-for-profit competitor interacts with a 
for-profit competitor.  What the study named mixed duopoly differs from the 
well-investigated mixed oligopoly competition, where one party pursues profit 
maximization while the other (most probably a public producer) aims at welfare   6
maximization (Cremer et al. 1989, 1991, DeFraja and Delbono 1989, Fershtman 1990, 
Fjell and Pal 1996, White 1996).  Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) 
showed that, as long as Windows’ pricing decision was not myopic, the result of the 
competition would be either the coexistence of the two products or Linux being 
driven out of the market.   
  Our paper takes a similar approach but differs from Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ghemawat (2003) in two aspects.  The main difference is in the research questions.  
Our work focuses on strategic choices for compatibility – a topic seldom investigated 
in previous studies on open source software.  We seek to find the best compatibility 
strategy rather than predict the results of competition.  Furthermore, we model the 
consumers’ heterogeneous preferences for products, which depend on two factors: the 
learning cost of adopting a software product varies for different consumers, and the 
difference in their past experiences, i.e., the extent of ‘lock-in’ is different among 
consumers and their switching costs are different.  Due to these two factors, 
consumers have different tastes for the products.  The consumers who have lower 
taste for the open source software would rather choose the proprietary software even 
though the open source software is free of charge.  The difference in the consumers 
taste allows rich intuitive interpretations for real-world software competition. 
 
3. Basic Model    
  Consider a software market where two software products are located at the ends 
of a unit line, i.e., the open source software (O) is located at x=0 and the proprietary 
software (P) is located at x=1 (see Figure 1).  Consumers are uniformly distributed 
along the unit interval and they have unit demand for the software.  Consumers 
differ in their taste for the products.    Specifically, for a consumer located at [,] x 01 ∈ , 
she incurs utility cost tx if she uses the open source software because of the difference 
between her ideal preference and the product specifications.  Similarly, she incurs 
utility cost t(1-x) if she chooses the proprietary software, where t  measures the 
consumers’ taste difference.  We assume that the marginal costs of both the open 
source and proprietary software products are zero.  Following Katz and Shapiro   7
(1985), the network externalities are a linear function of the number of users who 
adopt the same or compatible software products.   
 
      Figure 1:    The Basic Hotelling Model 
  In the basic model, we assume that the two products have the same inherent 
quality s and are incompatible, and the market is fully covered, i.e., all the consumers 
choose to use one of the two software products.    This is always true when the benefit 
of the product is sufficiently large.    If a consumer located at x adopts the open source 
software, her net utility  o U  would be  oo o Us k q t xq γ = +− +, where  o q  is the 
number of open source users and  k  is the degree of contribution of each consumer 
to the quality of the open source software.  The parameter  γ  refers to the network 
externality that a software user receives from other users of same or compatible 
software.  We assume that the open source software product is freely available, and 
there is no price component in the net utility.    Similarly, if the consumer located at x 
adopts the proprietary software, her net utility  p U  is  () pp Us t 1 x qp γ = −− + − , 
where  p q  denotes the number of proprietary software users and p is the price of the 
proprietary software. 
  Suppose the consumer at  [ , ] c x 01 ∈  is indifferent between the open source and 
proprietary software products, then from  p o U U = , we have: 
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From 1 0 < < c x , and applying the second-order condition for profit maximization, 
we have:   
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  x c  O  P   8
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  The profit for the proprietary software producer is: 
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  The base-level qualities of proprietary and open source software are identical.  
However, the quality of the open source software increases with the number of users, 
and the price of open source software is zero.  Hence, in equilibrium, the open 
source software has a bigger market share than the proprietary software. 
 
4. Compatibility and Profits 
  In the basic model, we assumed that the open source and proprietary software 
were  incompatible.  However,  the  proprietary software producer may also choose for 
its product to be compatible to some degree with the open source software. Which is 
the best strategy?  How does this compatibility decision change the profitability of 
proprietary software?  To answer these questions, we extend our basic model to   9
consider different degrees of compatibility.    As in common with the Hotelling model, 
the analysis depends on whether the market is fully covered.   
4.1. Fully Covered Market   
We firstly present how the utility functions of the open source and proprietary 
software consumers change according to different compatibility strategy when the 
market is fully covered.    Next, we summarize the net utilities of the open source and 
proprietary software consumers and the equilibrium outcomes under different 
compatibility strategies in Table 1. 
z  Two-way compatibility 
  Two-way compatibility is the case where the open source and proprietary 
software are compatible with each other.  Then, users of the two software products 
share the same network externality.
5  Since the market is fully covered, the total 
number of software users is 1.    Thus, the network externality is γ γ = + ) ( p o q q . 
z  Inward compatibility 
  We define inward compatibility as the case where the proprietary software is 
compatible with the open source software, but the open source software is not 
compatible with the proprietary software.  In this case, the network externality for 
users of the proprietary software is  ( ) op qq γ γ + = , and the network externality for 
users of the open source software is  o q γ . 
z  Outward compatibility 
  Outward compatibility is defined as the case where the proprietary software is 
incompatible with the open source software, but the open source software is 
compatible with the proprietary software.  In this case, the network externality for 
                                                        
5  Following the previous literature (Farrell and Saloner 1992), we suppose the network externality 
intensity  γ   is the same for all the networks. 
   10
users of the proprietary software is  p q γ , and the network externality for users of the 
open source software is  () op qq γ γ += .  
Table 1 reports the net utilities of the open source and proprietary software 
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Table 1: Fully Covered Market: Equilibrium Outcomes   
 
4.2. Partly Covered Market 
  Suppose the market is partly covered.  Then some consumers use neither the 
open source software nor the proprietary software.  This may happen when the 
                                                        
6  In this and following tables,  o U and  p U indicate the net utilities of open source and proprietary 
software consumers respectively;  * p and  * π are the equilibrium price and profit of the 
proprietary software; 
*
o M   and 
*
p M represent the equilibrium market share of open source and 
proprietary software respectively.   11
benefit provided by the software is small compared with users’ cost.  The basic 
model is thus changed as follows: 
 
        F i g u r e   2 :   C o m p e t i t i o n :   P a r t l y   C o v e r e d   M a r k e t  
  The consumers at  [ , ] o x 0x ∈   would choose the open source software, where xo is 
the location of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between using and not using 
the open source software.  On the other hand, the consumers at [ , ] p x 1x1 ∈ −  would 
choose the proprietary software, where  p x − 1  is the location of the marginal 
consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the proprietary software.   
The third group of consumers at  [ , ] op x x1x ∈ −  will choose neither the open source 
software nor the proprietary software. 
  The net utilities of the open source and proprietary software consumers under 
different compatibility strategies are reported in Table 2.  By setting  o U0 =  and 
p U0 = , we can get the equilibrium outcomes, which are also summarized in Table 2. 
 
  Two-way Compatibility  Inward Compatibility 
Outward 
Compatibility   
 Incompatibility 
o U   () oo op s kq tx q q γ +− + + 
oo o s kq tx q γ +− +  () oo op s kq tx q q γ +− + + 
oo o s kq tx q γ +− +
p U   () po p s tx q q p γ −+ +−   () po p s tx q q p γ − ++ − pp s tx q p γ − +−   pp s tx q p γ − +−  
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Table 2: Partly Covered Market: Equilibrium Outcomes   
 
5. Quality Differences   
  In section 4, the base-level qualities of the open source software and proprietary 
software are assumed to be equal.  Since the open source software will increase in 
quality corresponding to the number of users, the market share of the open source 
software is higher than that of the proprietary software.    In some situations, however, 
this condition may not be true.  In this section, we extend the model and give the 
equilibrium outcomes when the base-level quality of the proprietary software is 
different from that of the open source software.   
  Suppose the open source software and the proprietary software products have 
different qualities, denoted by  o s  and  p s  respectively.  With similar procedures in 
section 4, we can get the net utilities of open source and proprietary software 
consumers and the equilibrium outcomes under different market coverage conditions, 
which are reported in Table 3 and Table 4. 
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Table 3: Quality Differences: Fully Covered Market 
 
•    Partly Covered Market 
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Table 4: Quality Differences: Partly Covered Market 
 
6. Best Compatibility Strategy   
  We examine the best compatibility strategy under different market coverage 
conditions by comparing the equilibrium outcomes in section 4 and section 5, and 
derive the following results:   
Proposition 1    A proprietary software producer should never choose 
incompatibility or outward compatibility. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 1. 
  Under all conditions, the proprietary producer should not choose incompatibility 
or outward compatibility.  Intuitively, to the proprietary software producer, inward 
compatibility can bring more profit than incompatibility by allowing proprietary 
software users to share the network benefits from open source users.  Furthermore, 
incompatibility is always better than outward compatibility, in that it prevents open 
source software users to share the network benefits from proprietary software users.  
Therefore, incompatibility and outward compatibility would never be the best strategy.   
Consistent with these results, in reality, outward compatibility can hardly be observed.   
Incompatibility is also rare.   15
Proposition 2    When the market is partly covered, a proprietary software 
producer earns highest profit from two-way compatibility, followed by outward 
compatibility, and last, incompatibility or outward compatibility. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 1. 
When the market is partly covered, one additional open source software user does 
not decrease the number of proprietary software users.  In this case, an increase in 
open source software users can benefit proprietary software users through the network 
externality, without decreasing the market share of the proprietary software.   
Therefore, two-way compatibility is a win-win strategy: it increases the proprietary 
producers’ profit while enhancing the user base of the open source software, which 
generate positive externalities for the users of the proprietary software. 
Realistically, most software markets are not fully covered.  Thus, two-way 
compatibility is common.   Typical examples include: Internet vs. Mozilla, 
Microsoft Outlook vs. Mozilla Thunderbird.  Furthermore, some proprietary 
software producers are improving the compatibility with open source software.  For 
instance, Microsoft has committed in perpetuity to offering a royalty-free license of 
Office-related XML document formats, which encourages other open source software, 
such as Open Office, to create “filters” to read the files created in Microsoft Office 
(CNet  News,  2004  b).        
Proposition 3.1   When the market is fully covered, the proprietary software 
producer earns highest profit from inward compatibility, and lowest profit from 
outward compatibility.  However, the profitability of two-way compatibility and 
incompatibility depends on the quality difference between the open source software 
and the proprietary software. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 1. 
Proposition 3.2   When the market is fully covered and the quality difference 
between proprietary software and open source software is sufficiently small that 
() ( )
po




−< , the proprietary software producer earns highest   16
profit from inward compatibility, followed by two-way compatibility, incompatibility, 
and last, outward compatibility. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 1. 
Proposition 3.3   When the market is fully covered and the quality difference 
between proprietary software and open source software is sufficiently large that 
() ( )
po




−> , the proprietary software producer earns highest 
profit from inward compatibility, followed by incompatibility, two-way compatibility, 
and last, outward compatibility. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 1. 
A covered market indicates that the two products are in severe competition, i.e., 
one product can gain a user only if the other product loses one user.  Thus, the 
proprietary software producer should adopt a strategy which promotes the increase of 
its product while restraining the growth of open source software.  Inward 
compatibility allows proprietary software users to share the network externality of 
open source users, while preventing open source software users from sharing the 
network externality of the proprietary software.  Therefore, it becomes the best 
compatibility  strategy.        
In a covered market, the profit ranking of the incompatibility and two-way 
compatibility varies according to the quality difference between the open source and 
proprietary software.  On the one hand, the price of the proprietary software with 
two-way compatibility is higher than that with incompatibility (see Table 3).    On the 
other hand, the market share of the proprietary software with two-way compatibility 
may be lower than that with incompatibility.  This could happen when the 
proprietary software has sufficiently higher quality and becomes the dominating 
software in the market.  Combining the price and market share factors together, we 
may conclude that once the quality of the proprietary software is high enough and the 
market share factor dominates the price factor, the proprietary software producer will 
choose incompatibility rather than two-way compatibility.   17
Such results provide theoretical explanation for the actual behavior of proprietary 
software producers.    For instance, Windows update website denies access by Firefox, 
the new open source browser.    It shows that Microsoft refuses to be compatible with 
Firefox, and thus restrains its growth. 
The change of the profit ranking of incompatibility and two-way compatibility is 
consistent with the argument of Katz and Shapiro (1985).  They develop a static 
model of oligopoly and conclude that the firms with large existing network 
externalities will tend to be against compatibility.  In contrast, firms with small 
existing network externalities will tend to favor product compatibility.    In the case of 
proprietary vs. open source software, when the proprietary software has sufficiently 
high quality, its existing network externalities are large.  Hence, the proprietary 
software producer favors incompatibility over two-way compatibility.  In contrast, 
when the quality of the proprietary software is sufficiently small, proprietary software 
has small existing network externalities.  Therefore, two-way compatibility is more 
profitable than incompatibility. 
 Moreover, we extend the conclusion of Katz and Shapiro (1985) by adding the 
inward and outward compatibility, which they did not consider.  We show that, in 
both fully covered and partly covered markets, inward compatibility is always a 
superior strategy to incompatibility.    Hence, their conclusion that incompatibility can 
be the best strategy may not hold if inward compatibility can be realized.   
 
7. Welfare   
  In this section, we calculate the social welfare and investigate how the 
parametersγ , s, k and t affect the social welfare.   Social welfare in this model is the 
sum of sellers’ profit and consumers’ surplus.  Since the open source software is 
freely distributed, we deem that sellers’ profit from the open source software is zero. 
For tractability, we assume that the base-level qualities of proprietary and open source 
software are equal.   18
  We investigate the case where the market is fully covered.  The proprietary 
software producer is assumed to adopt the best strategy: inward compatibility.  The 
welfare is denoted as W and presented as follows: 
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For the detailed calculations, please refer to Appendix 2. 
  We next investigate how the changes in the parameters s, γ, k and t affect the 
welfare.    The results of the comparative statics are summarized in Table 5.
7  
 
  Table 5: Social Welfare   
Firstly, it is intuitive that the increase in quality will raise the social welfare. 
Secondly, with the increase of the network externality intensity γ , the consumer 
surplus of both the open source users and the proprietary software users will increase. 
Thus, the social welfare will increase.  Thirdly, higher k increases the quality of the 
open source software.  Hence, consumer surplus increases.  However, the increase 
in k reduces sellers’ profit.  From the comparative statics, it can be seen that the 
increase in consumer surplus dominates the decrease in sellers’ profit, and welfare 
increases with the increase in k.  
 Moreover,  the  first  order derivative of W with respect to t is: 




W k k t 3t 2 k 3t 2 k 2 t k t k 1
t 2 2t k 4 2t k 2 2t k 2
γγ γ γ γ γ
γγ γ
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  = − − +
∂− − − − − −
. 
                                                        
7  We also calculated welfare with two-way compatibility when the market is fully covered.    The 
results of comparative statics are the same. 
  Increase in s  Increase in γ  Increase in k  Increase in t 
Welfare  + + + -   19
It is complicated to determine the sign of this equation analytically.    Thus, we plot a 
figure to show how welfare changes according to t.  In Figure 3, we fixs0 =  and 
. 05 γ = , and show that with the increase of taste difference t, the social welfare will 
decrease.
8  On the one hand, higher t binds consumers to the proprietary software 
and increases the monopoly power of the proprietary software.  Thus, the sellers’ 
profits will increase.  On the other hand, higher t lowers the consumer surplus.  
From Figure 3, we can see that the latter impact dominates the former one and social 






Figure 3: Welfare when  . 05 γ = and  s0 =  
 
8. Extension 
8.1. Open Source Software Aiming at Increasing the Market Share   
  In the previous chapters, we have assumed that the proprietary software producer 
seeks profit maximization while open source software reacts passively.  For certain 
                                                        
8  We have tried other values of s and  γ . The results are quite similar.   20
open source software, however, maximizing market share could be the aim.  For 
instance, Sun uses StarOffice to battle with Miscrosoft Office and has won over 10 
percent total market share (PC World News 2002).   
  In the above case, the competition changes to an asymmetric duopoly, where the 
proprietary software pursues the profit maximization and the open source software 
aims at maximizing market share.  What would the best compatibility strategy be?  
We use a one-period game model to analyze this situation and derive the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 4    When open source software aims at maximizing market share 
and proprietary pursues maximum profit, the competition between open source and 
proprietary software results in two-way compatibility in both fully covered and partly 
covered markets. 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 3. 
  The different aims of the open source software will affect the compatibility 
choices of the proprietary software.  As mentioned previously, when the market is 
partly covered, two-way compatibility is a win-win strategy for both open source and 
proprietary software, and therefore, a Nash Equilibrium.  Moreover, when the 
market is fully covered and both parties have their maximization aims, if either party 
chooses incompatibility, the other will choose compatibility to share benefit through 
network externality.    Therefore, two-way compatibility will be a Nash Equilibrium.             
8.2. ‘Proprietary vs. Open’ and ‘Proprietary vs. Proprietary’ 
  Today, opening the source code has become a trend that more and more 
proprietary software products are adopting.  For instance, IBM has offered the 
source code of Cloudscape, a Java-based relational database software worth $85 
million, to the Apache Software Foundation.  The goal is to spur Java application 
development (IDG News Service 2004).  Microsoft .Net, the rival of Java, will be 
seriously affected by such move of IBM. 
  How does the competition with open source software change the behavior of the 
proprietary software producer compared with the case where the rival is another   21
proprietary producer?  Will the change to open source software benefit the social 
welfare?    We investigate these questions by comparing market outcomes of the basic 
model with those of the “proprietary vs. proprietary” case.   
•  Comparison of price, market share and profit 
  Let us consider a covered duopoly market where two proprietary software 
producers compete.    We consider two symmetric cases: incompatibility and two-way 
compatibility.    Here, we do not go through the details of the procedures because the 
results of two symmetric producers under Hotelling model are well known.  We 
simply claim the following proposition. 
Proposition 5    When the competitor is an open source software product, the 
proprietary software developer faces lower price, lower market share, and lower profit 
compared with the case when the rival is another proprietary software developer.   
<proof> Please see the Appendix 4. 
  As Proposition 5 indicates, it is better for a proprietary software product to 
compete with another proprietary software product than contend with open source 
software.    When its rival changes from a proprietary software product to open source 
software, the proprietary software producer is worse off in every aspect.  Such 
results explain why Microsoft executives have publicly decried that the open-source 
movement is, at the minimum, bad for competition, and, at worst, a "cancer" to 
everything it touches (CNet News 2001).  Furthermore, our results are consistent 
with Microsoft’s sensitivity to Netscape or Sun opening up some parts of their 
products.  
•  Comparison of the social welfare 
Proposition 6    When two proprietary software products are compatible and the 
market is fully covered, the change of one proprietary software to open source 
software will increase social welfare if and only if  ( )
32 tk 3 t k <− . 
<proof> Please see the Appendix 5.   22
  Such results are counterintuitive.  Generally, it is believed that the open source 
software will benefit the social welfare by providing free high quality software. 
However, the results indicate that this is not always the case.  The change of the 
proprietary software to open source software may lower social welfare under the 
condition that the consumers taste difference t is sufficiently high.   











changes in term of t and k, where  pp W  
represents the social welfare with competition between two compatible proprietary 
software products and  op W  indicates the social welfare when one of the proprietary 
software changes to open source software. 
 
 
Figure 4: Picture of  op pp WW −   
  From Figure 4, we can see that when k is small and t is large, the welfare of 
“proprietary vs. open” is smaller than that of “proprietary vs. proprietary”, which 
means that social welfare is worse off when one of the proprietary software products 
changes to open source software.  In contrast, when k is large and t is small, the 
change of the proprietary software to open source software benefits the social welfare.   
k 
t 
op pp WW −  23
  The reason is that the change to the open source software increases the software 
quality, which has two opposite impacts on the social welfare.  On the one hand, 
higher quality increases the consumer surplus and raises the social welfare.  On the 
other hand, higher quality of the open source software drives the marginal consumers 
to switch from proprietary software to open source software.  Since open source 
software covers more than half of the whole market share (see section 3), these 
marginal consumers move from the nearer software to the further one, and the 
consumer surplus decrease.  In Figure 4, one can see that when t is large and k is 
small, the reduction in consumer surplus is the dominating factor and the social 
welfare will be lower. 
  Such results suggest that governments should not encourage the open source 
movement unconditionally.  For instance, following Munich’s decision to switch 
from Microsoft software to open source software, Paris postponed a similar move in 
light of the incompatible problem and high migration cost (ZDNet news, 2004).   
 
9. Conclusion   
  We used the Hotelling model to investigate competition between open source and 
proprietary software.  Firstly, we focused on the compatibility choices of the 
proprietary software.  It was shown that the best compatibility strategy depends on 
the degrees of market coverage. When the market is fully covered, inward 
compatibility is the best strategy.  When the market is partly covered, however, 
two-way compatibility is the best strategy.  Moreover, the welfare analysis implied 
that the increase of t (the taste difference of consumers) may decrease the social 
welfare, although it can increase the profit of the proprietary software producer. 
  Next, we relaxed the conditions in the basic model and investigated the 
competition between open source and proprietary software in different scenarios. 
Firstly, we assumed that the open source software provider begins to maximize 
market share rather than reacts passively.  The results showed that two-way 
compatibility is the best choice for both the proprietary and the open source software.   24
  Secondly, we investigated the impact of the open source software from two 
aspects.  From the aspect of a proprietary software producer, we found that it does 
not favor its proprietary rival changing to open source software.  When the rival 
changes from proprietary to open source software, both the market share and the 
profit of the proprietary software producer will decease.  From the aspect of social 
welfare, we found that when the rival of a proprietary software product changes from 
proprietary to open source software, social welfare may be lower off if the consumers 
taste difference is sufficiently high.   
  It is important to consider how the model’s simplifying assumptions affect the 
conclusions.    Firstly, we have assumed the compatibility strategies are chosen by the 
proprietary software producer.  However, in the software market, the compatibility 
choice is decided not only by software producers but also by the software architecture. 
Sometimes, compatibility may not be feasible because the architecture of the two 
software products is quite different, while other times, the inward compatibility may 
be difficult to be technically implemented.    Our results may not be applicable in such 
cases.  
  Secondly, we have assumed there is no installed user base for both open source 
and proprietary software.  However, realistically, the open source software and the 
proprietary software may not enter the market simultaneously.  The software which 
enters earlier will grab the consumers and have large existing network externalities.  
Therefore, the best compatibility strategy may change.  Such limitation of the 
analysis suggests directions for future study.  In the further work, it would be 
interesting to consider how the installed user base affects the compatibility choices of 
the proprietary software. 
 Finally,  for  tractability,  we have assumed consumers taste difference is greater 
than the network externality intensity.    If this assumption is violated, the equilibrium 
results are unstable.  The switch of the marginal consumer from one software to the 
other results in that every consumer follows the switch.    Such a tipping market needs 
further  investigation.       25
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  Appendix 1. Best Compatibility Strategy   
1.1. Fully Covered Market   
In the proof procedures, strategy I denotes two-way compatible.    Strategy II denotes 
inward compatibility.  Strategy III and Strategy IV means the outward and 
incompatibility, respectively.   
z  Equal base-level qualities   
Table 1 reports the equilibrium outcomes of fully covered market when open source 
and proprietary software have equal base-level qualities.    From Table 1, we have: 
*( ) *( ) *( ) *( ) p I I I pI V pI pI I =< = ,                   ( A - 1 )  
*** * () () ( ) ( ) ppp p M I I I MI V MI MI I << < .                  ( A - 2 )  
By (A-1) and (A-2), it can be derived that  *( ) *( ) *( ) *( ) III IV I II π ππ π < << . 
z  Different base-level qualities 
When the market is fully covered and the base-level qualities of the open source and 
proprietary software are different, from Table 3, we have: 
() () ( ) ( ) p III p IV p I p II =< = , 
** () () pp M III M IV < ,
** () ( ) pp M IM I I < , 
** () () pp III IV ππ < ,
** () ( ) pp I II ππ < .                      ( A - 3 )  
To guarantee
*() p M IV 1 < , we have   
po ss3 t 3k γ −<−− .                                       ( A - 4 )  
Suppose 
** () ( ) pp IVI ππ = , we have   28
       
() ( )
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−=              ( A - 5 )   
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−> , then 
** () ( ) pp IVI ππ > .      (A-7)   








−< , then 
*** * () () ( ) ( ) ppp p III IV I II πππ π << < .  
Proposition 3.2 is proved. 
 








−> , then 
** () ( ) pp IVI ππ > .      (A-7)   
Under such case, to decide the sequence of the profit under different strategies, we 
need to compare 
*() p I π  with 
*() p III π , and compare 
*() p IV π  with 
*() p II π . 
First, we compare 
*() p I π  with 
*() p III π : 
Supposing 
** () ( ) pp I III ππ < , 
we have () ( ) po sst 2 t k 2 t k γ −> + − − −.               ( A - 8 )     29
Since () ( ) t2 t k 2 t k 3 t k 3 t 3 k γγ γ +−− − > − − > − − , (A-8) contradicts with (A-4).  
Therefore, 
*( ) *( ) III I π π < .                                     ( A - 9 )  
Secondly, we compare 
*() p IV π  with 
*() p II π : 
Supposing 
** () ( ) pp IVI I ππ > , we can get that 
() ( ) po sst 2 t k 2 t k γ γγ γ − >−+ −− −−− .                        ( A - 1 0 )            
Since  () ( ) t2 t k 2 t k 3 t 3 k γγγ γγ −+ −− −−− > − −, (A-10) contradicts with (A-4). 
Therefore, it can be derived that   
*( ) *( ) IVI I π π < .                                     ( A - 1 1 )  








−> , then 
** * * () ( ) ( ) () pp p p IVII II I I ππ π π << < . 
Proposition 3.3 is thus proved. 
Proposition 3.2 and proposition 3.3 lead to proposition 3.1 spontaneously. 
 
1.2. Partly Covered Market   
z  Equal base-level qualities   
Table 2 report the equilibrium outcomes of partly covered market when open source 
and proprietary software have equal base-level qualities.    From Table 2, we have: 
* ( )* ( )* ( )* ( ) p III p IV p II p I =< = ,                    ( A - 1 2 )    30
*** * () () ( ) ( ) ppp p M III M IV M II M I =< < .                   ( A - 1 3 )  
By (A-12) and (A-13), it can be derived that *( ) *( ) *( ) *( ) III IV II I π ππ π = << . 
 
z  Different base-level qualities 
Table 4 reports the equilibrium outcomes of partly covered market when open source 
and proprietary software have different base-level qualities.    From Table 4, we have: 
* ( )* ( )* ( )* ( ) p III p IV p II p I =< = ,                    ( A - 1 4 )  
*** * () () ( ) ( ) ppp p M III M IV M II M I =< < .                   ( A - 1 5 )  
By (A-14) and (A-15), it can be derived that  *( ) *( ) *( ) *( ) III IV II I π ππ π = << . 
Such results are the same as those when open source and proprietary software 
products have the equal base-level quality.    Therefore, the proposition 2 is proved. 
Proposition 2 and proposition 3.1 prove proposition 1 spontaneously.   31
 
Appendix 2. Calculation of the Welfare 
When the market is fully covered, proprietary software producer will choose inward 
compatibility.    Under such scenario, the welfare denoted as W is calculated as: 
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Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 4 
3.1. Fully Covered Market 
Suppose the open source software aims at maximizing market share and the 
proprietary software pursues the maximum profits.  And they choose the 
compatibility strategy simultaneously.  The payoffs under each strategy are listed in 
Table A.1.  The first number in each cell is the market share of the open source 
software, and the second number is the profit of the proprietary software.   
  


































































































Table A.1: Fully Covered Market:  Competition  Outcomes   
 
The Nash equilibrium can be solved as (Compatible, Compatible).    Therefore, when 
the market is fully covered, both open source and proprietary software will choose to 
be compatible with the rival and the result is two-way compatibility.   
Proprietary software    Proprietary software
Open 
Source 





3.2. Partly Covered Market 
Similarly, when the market is not fully covered, the payoffs under each strategy are 
listed in Table A.2.   
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Table A.2: Partly Covered Market:  Competition  Outcomes   
 
The Nash equilibrium can be solved as (Compatible, Compatible).    Therefore, when 
the market is not covered, both open source and proprietary software will choose to be 
compatible with their rival, and the result is two-way compatibility.   
              Proprietary  Software  34
 
Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 5 
4.1. Incompatibility 
When two software products are incompatible, the equilibrium outcomes of the 
proprietary software are listed in the following table, where the second row is the case 
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Table A.3: The Comparison of Two Cases Where Two Products Are Incompatible 
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Therefore, the equilibrium profit of the “proprietary vs. proprietary” case is higher 
than that of the “open vs. proprietary” case. 
 
4.2. Two-way Compatibility 
Table A.4 shows the equilibrium price, market share and the profit of the proprietary 





Market Share  Profit 




















Table A.4: The Comparison of Two Cases Where Two Products Are Compatible 
 
It is straightforward that the equilibrium profit under the “proprietary vs. proprietary” 
case is higher than that under “open vs. proprietary” case.   36
Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 6 
5.1. Social Welfare: Proprietary vs. Proprietary 
Suppose that the market is fully covered and two software products are two-way 
compatible.  The  equilibrium  price,  market share and profits are shown as follows: 
**












where the footnote 1 and 2 denote the first proprietary and the second proprietary 
software respectively. 
Using  pp W  to denote the welfare when two proprietary software products compete 
together, we have: 
**
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5.2. Social Welfare: Open vs. Proprietary 
When two proprietary software compete together and one of them changes to open 
source software, we suppose that it aims at market share maximization.  Therefore,   37
the best strategy is two-way compatibility.  Using  op W  to denote the welfare, we 
have: 
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5.3. Social Welfare: “Open vs. Proprietary” vs. “Proprietary vs. Proprietary” 
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               =
−
   ( A - 2 1 )  
Therefore, we have: 
If ( )
32 tk 3 t k >− , then  op pp WW < .  
If ( )
32 tk 3 t k <− , then  op pp WW >  